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ABSTRACT 
This paper considers the provisions of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 
(UNCLOS) which relate to the conservation and management of the living resources of the 
exclusive economic zone. New Zealand's fisheries legislation, particularly the Fisheries Act 
1996, is analysed and measured against the obligations imposed on coastal States by 
UNCLOS. 
The Fisheries Act 1996 is considered in terms of the overall philosophy and effect of the Act, 
and specific provisions are considered in greater detail to determine whether they are 
consistent with particular obligations under UNCLOS. 
The paper argues that as UNCLOS is an umbrella convention expressed in broad terms, the 
coastal State has substantial discretion in fulfilling its obligations under UNCLOS. The 
obligations are expressed in such general terms that States may promote their own best 
interests in fulfilling their obligations. The philosophy of New Zealand's fisheries legislation is 
derived from and consistent with that of UN CLOS. The detail of the Fisheries Act is imbued 
with that philosophy, which permeates all decision-making under the Fisheries Act. 
It is noted that, in relation to the provision of access to the fisheries of the EEZ to foreign 
vessels, there is some scope under the Fisheries Act for New Zealand to act in a way which is 
arguably contrary to the intent of UNCLOS, although there is no opportunity for other States 
to challenge New Zealand's decisions. 
WORD LENGTH 
The text of this paper (excluding contents page, footnotes and bibliography) comprises 
approximately 14,833 words. 
~ { ( ( < ( ( ( (((( ( ( ( 
____ ,_ - ... 
,,. - - - I ,. 
-
,. -• - . - •.1 • .. .. ... ' . . - ... ---- .. - ~ 
) >, >)) ')} > )) >) > > 
lll 
NEW ZEALAND'S APPROACH TO DOMESTIC 
FISHERIES MANAGEMENT 
New Zealand's Fisheries Act 1996 purports to recogrnse New Zealand ' s 
international obligations relating to fishing, particularly the United Nations 
Convention on the Law of the Sea 1982 (UNCLOS) . This paper had its 
genesis in a submission 1 on the Fisheries Bill ( which became the Fisheries Act 
1996) which, inter alia, alleged that the Bill's focus on maximum sustainable 
yield as the basis for fisheries management was inconsistent with New Zealand's 
international obligations under UNCLOS. However, the scope of this paper is 
broader than the issue raised by the submission. 
This paper is in three parts . Part I describes and analyses those provisions of 
UNCLOS that relate to the use and conservation of the living marine resources 
and which are applicable in the exclusive economic zones (EEZs) of coastal 
States. It then summarises the obligations of coastal States under UN CLOS . 
Part II of this paper considers the scheme of New Zealand ' s fisheries legislation 
to ascertain whether, as a whole, it conforms with New Zealand ' s international 
obligations under UNCLOS . There is particular focus on the provisions of the 
Fisheries Act 1996. 
In conclusion, part III addresses the question of the consistency of New 
Zealand's fisheries management system with the requirements of UNCLOS . lt 
raises some issues concerning potential threats to the success of New Zealand ' s 
system which are outside the scope of this paper but warrant further attention . 
Submission of the New Zealand Fishing lndustl)' Board on the Fisheries Bill. 
LAW LIBR'"'RY 
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THE PROVISIONS OF UNCLOS 
The legal regime which pertains to the EEZ of coastal States is set out in Part V 
ofUNCLOS. UNCLOS entered into force in 1994, shortly before the Fisheries 
Bill was introduced into Parliament. It was ratified by New Zealand in 1996. 
Article 57 establishes the concept of a 200 nautical mile EEZ.2 Prior to the 
Convention entering into force, New Zealand had already declared an EEZ of 
200 rniles. 3 New Zealand's jurisdiction over its EEZ is fundamental to the 
application of its domestic fisheries legislation . Under article 56( 1 )(a) of 
UNCLOS, New Zealand, as a coastal State, has, in its EEZ -
sovereign rights for the purpose of exploring and exploiting. conser."ing and 
managing the natural resources, whether living or non-living. of the waters 
superjacent to the sea-bed and of the sea-bed and its subsoil .... 
The coastal State has sovereign rights, but not sovereignty over the resources of 
the EEZ.
4 
The use of the words "sovereign rights" makes it clear that the 
coastal State has the authority to make the decisions concerning access to and 
use of the natural resources of its EEZ, and that no other State or organisation 
has the right to participate in that decision-making 5 The term " sovereign 
rights" is used in conjunction with "sovereignty" in article 13 7 ( 1) as to the legal 
status of the Area and its resources, reinforcing the conclusion that sovereign 
rights are not the same thing as sovereignty. The concomitant obligation is that , 
in exercising its rights and performing its duties in the EEZ, the coastal State is 
required to have due regard to the rights and duties of other States. lt is 
Every reference to " miles" in the balance of this paper should be taken as a reference to 
"nautical miles" . 
Territorial Sea, Contiguous Zone, and the Exclusive Economic Zone Act 1977 . 
Lawrence Juda "The Exclusive Economic Zone: compatibility of National Claims and the 
United Nations Law of the Sea" ( 1986) 16 Ocean Dev & Int ' 1 Law l. 5 . Juda notes the same 
distinction was made in the 1958 Continental Shelf Convention (article 2( I) and that 
"sovereignty" denotes a fuller set of powers and control. 
WT Burke The New International Law of Fisheries - United Nations Conference on the Lmr 
of the Sea 1982 and Beyond Oxford Monographs in International Law. Clarendon Press. 
Oxford 1994, 39. Balton states that UNCLOS provides States with rights amounting to "frill 
authority over all fishing activities" in the their EEZs: David Balton, "Strengthening the 
Law of the Sea: The New Agreement on Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish 
Stocks" (1996) 27 Ocean Dev & Int'l Law 125, 126. 
6 
8 
9 
generally accepted that the words "exploring and exploiting, conservmg and 
managing" cover the range of activities involved in fishing . 
A The Theory behind the Extension of Coastal State Jurisdiction 
Many factors lead to over-exploitation of the fisheries resources of the high 
seas,6 including improved fishing methods, substantial government subsidies to 
fishers, and the degradation of some fish habitats . These factors , together with 
the unilateral extension of jurisdiction by some States, lead to the success of 
coastal States in claiming increased jurisdiction over areas of the high seas 
adjacent to their coasts at the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of 
the Sea. 7 Proposals to establish international organisations to regulate fishing 
on the high seas were unsuccessful, perhaps because international mechanisms 
had proved ineffective in dealing with the greatly increased pressures on the 
fisheries resources of the high seas. 
The extended jurisdiction of coastal States generally brought those part s of the 
high seas with the richest living resources within the jurisdiction of coastal 
States. More than 90% of all fish currently caught in the ocean are harvested 
within 200 miles of land .8 
Extended jurisdiction was intended to address the problems of open access 
inherent in common property resources, viz the tragedy of the commons. Burke 
summarises the development of extended coastal State jurisdiction - 9 
In short , during the first three decades after WWII , almost al I coastal states lacked 
sufficient control over adjacent fisheries to establish an effective management 
regime. At the same time, coastal states and fishing sta tes lacked the political \\·ill 
to create international bodies, with the necessary competence and assets to 
Above note 5, Balton, 130. 
Grant James Hewison "High Seas Driftnet Fishing in the South Pacific and the L rn of the 
Sea" (1993) 5 Geo Int'l Env ' tl L Rev 23 9, 335 . 
Above note 5, Balton, 127 . 
Above note 5, Burke, 24 . 
3 
10 
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4 
implement effective management. This combined record of futility eventually lead 
to wide spread large extension of national jurisdiction for fishery purposes, and the 
extension became customary international law. 
The resources gained by coastal States have been largely at the expense of the 
distant water fishing nations . Kearney records that extended jurisdiction 
arrested the rate of decline of stocks, but predicted that this improvement might 
be short term if the coastal States allowed the fishing effort of its nationals in 
their EEZs to rise in substitution for that of the distant water fishing nations 
which previously fished those areas unrestrictedly. 10 Indeed, later in the same 
volume of essays, Edward L Miles notes that extended coastal State jurisdiction 
provided the impetus for coastal States to develop their own capacity to 
harvest, process and market the resources of their EEZs . 11 
B The Obligations of Coastal States with respect to the Living Resources 
oftheEEZ 
Articles 61 and 62 set out the general obligations of coastal States under 
UNCLOS. Article 61 addresses the conservation of living resources, and article 
62 relates to their utilisation. The responsibility for conservation of the living 
resources and for the allocation of rights to use the living resources is vested in 
the coastal State. 
Articles 61 and 62 are drafted in broad and imprecise language leaving the way 
open for various interpretations. Burke found the fisheries provisions of the 
Convention to be "exceedingly complex" Terms such as "allowable catch", 
Robert Kearney "Does Extended Jurisdiction enable us to do better?" in Edward L Miles (ed) 
Management of World Fisheries: Implications of Extended Coastal State Jurisdiction 
(University of Washington Press, 1989) 273, 275. 
Edward L Miles "Conclusions" in Edward L Miles (ed) A!anage111e111 of World I0sheries. 
Implications of Extended Coastal State Jurisdiction (University of Washington Press, 1989) 
282,298. 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
"best scientific evidence available", and "relevant environmental and economic 
factors" constitute "a thicket for the unwary". 12 
1 Obligation to determine the "allowable catch "13 
The coastal State is required to determine the allowable catch of fish in its EEZ. 
Determination of the allowable catch is a precursor to exploitation of those fish 
in a managed way. Exploitation (ie the taking of fish) occurs whether or not 
the coastal State has set the allowable catch for a particular species, unless the 
coastal State has otherwise regulated or prohibited the taking of particular 
species and assuming that there is no illegal fishing. Setting a limit on the 
allowable catch, therefore, constrains the use of the resource. Article 61 does 
not define nor elaborate on how the allowable catch is to be determined. 
However, the Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO) has defined "allowable 
catch" as - 14 
that catch which, if taken in any one year, will best enable the objecti\'eS of 
[fisheries] management (eg the optimum long term yield [of the fish stock]) to be 
achieved. 
To determine the "allowable catch" as defined by F AO, coastal States need 
access to accurate and adequate information about a wide range of matters 
relating to fish stocks, and to reliable catch and effort statistics from the fishing 
industry. Obtaining information of the necessary quality and quantity is difficult 
and costly, especially for developing States. 15 In addition, information about 
more than just biological and ecological factors is required; the social and 
economic interests of the States concerned must also be considered . 16 
Although expressed in mandatory terms, the obligation of the coastal State to 
determine the allowable catch of the living resources of the EEZ cannot 
WT Burke The Law of the Sea: Customary Norms and Conve111io11a/ Rules 81 Proc. of the 
Am Soc'y of Int'l L 75-77 (1987) as cited in Hewison, abO\·e note 7 at p 33-L note 95 . 
Article 61(1). 
Department of Fisheries of the F AO, Third United Nations Co11ference on the Law of the 
Sea, UN Doc GE 75-64093 , cited as edited by Hewison, above note 7 at 355 . 
Above note 5, Burke 45. 
M Dahmani The Fisheries Regime of the l:.xc/usive Eco110111ic Zone (M Nijhoff, Dordrecht. 
1987); cited in Hewison, above note 7 at 356, note 202 . 
5 
6 
practically be as stringent an obligation as it appears on paper. Most States 
cannot acquire sufficient information to be in a position to determine an 
allowable catch level for every stock or species of living resources in their 
EEZs, nor are States, especially developing States, likely to have sufficient other 
resources (such as skilled personnel) . This suggests that the coastal State has a 
discretion in determining when it has sufficient information about any stock or 
species to determine an allowable catch level for it , and to make decisions as to 
the priority order in which stocks will be assessed for the purpose of setting an 
allowable catch. There are so many variables involved in a coastal State's 
decisions that, in effect, it has a very generous discretion . Inevitably, these 
decisions will reflect the coastal State' s wider interests . 
The term " living resources" may be interpreted very broadly . However, in the 
context of article 61 ( 1 ), "living resources" is restricted to meaning the 
"currently harvested living resources". After all , there is no necessity for an 
allowable catch to be set for species of living resources which are not harvested . 
Presumably article 61 ( 1) also covers non target species taken as bycatch, ie 
those killed or harmed accidentally or incidentally to fishing activities, but not to 
protected species . It seems likely that the obligation to determine allowable 
catch must be interpreted in a practical way and in the light of the resources 
available to coastal States, as well as the scientific information available to them . 
Even if the coastal States had adequate resources and it were practically 
possible to determine an allowable catch for every species or stock of living 
resources, it would entail a huge waste of resources, since comparatively little 
benefit would accrue. It is more practical that States have a discretion to 
identify stocks which would benefit from restricted catch levels . 
Even if article 61 ( 1) means literally what it says, States would be unable to 
determine the allowable catch levels for all species at once, and would thus have 
delayed their ratification of UN CLOS and its coming into force indefinitely It 
is more likely that a reasonable time for determining allowable catch levels for 
all species should be implied in the article. 
17 
18 
19 
2 Obligation to ensure that over-exploitation does not endanger the 
maintenance of the living resources 
The coastal State is obliged to "ensure, through proper conservation and 
management measures, that the maintenance of the living resources in the [EEZ] 
is not endangered by over-exploitation" . The words "maintenance" and 
"endangered" appear to be redundant. The quoted section of the clause could 
more simply be rendered "shall ensure through proper conservation and 
management measures that the living resources of the EEZ are not over-
exploited" . 
"Conservation" may be interpreted in two ways; restrictively to mean 
"preservation", or widely to mean "wise use" .17 Arguably, in article 61 , it 
should be given its wider meaning. The very fact of the coastal State being 
required to determine the allowable catch makes it clear that ··conservation" 
encompasses "use". It is generally accepted that the objective of conservation is 
to maintain the stocks of marine species at high levels so that they are not in 
danger of decimation if environmental conditions become unfavourable 
18 
Proper conservation and management measures are the means for preventing 
over-exploitation. 
The United Nations Conference on Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly 
Migratory Fish Stocks elaborated on the obligation contained in a11icle l 18 of 
UNCLOS that "States shall co-operate with each other in the conservation and 
management of living resources in the areas of the high seas" . 
19 The 
Negotiating Text prepared by the Chairman of the Conference addressed the 
nature of the conservation and management measures to be established . 
Lee M Talbot, Living Resource Conservation: An International Oven ,1e1r (US Marine 
Mammal Commission, Washington, 1996) 1. 
Edwin S Iverson Living !vfarine Resources - Their Utilization and Management (Chapman 
& Hall, New York, 1996) 244 . 
Report of the New Zealand Delegation to the United Nations Conference on Straddling Fish 
Stocks and Highly lvfigratory Fish Stocks (Wellington. 1993) 9. 
7 
8 
20 
21 
22 
23 
"Conservation and management measures" specifically include - 20 
• total allowable catch and quota; 
• limits to fishing effort; 
• fish size limits or other measures to promote optimum utilisation of 
targeted species; 
• gear restrictions; 
• area and seasonal closures. 
As the Convention on Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks 
is expressly intended to elaborate on, and be consistent with, UNCLOS, it 
appears that the international community accepts that the "conservation and 
management measures" referred to in both articles 61 and l 18 are not restricted 
to determining the allowable catch .2 1 
Articles 56 and 61 (2) read together have the effect of authorising the coastal 
State alone to determine the total allowable catch and decide what other proper 
conservation and management measures it will take. 22 The arbitral award of 15 
r July 1986 between Canada and France (La Bretagne Award) ·' addressed the 
ambit of a coastal State's authority under article 56 of UNCLOS . Canada had 
prohibited the filleting of fish aboard French trawlers in the ground fishery in the 
Gulf of St Lawrence, although the French trawlers were permitted to fish in the 
area. Canada based its assertion of authority on its sovereign rights in respect 
of conserving the natural resources of its EEZ. The Tribunal found in favour of 
Canada, reinforcing that it is a matter for the coastal State to determine what 
are the proper conservation and management measures to be i'.11plemented . 
In the identification of species that would benefit from the implementation of 
conservation and management measures, the coastal State is required "to take 
into account the best scientific information available to it". States concerned 
Article 4 of the Negotiating Text; refer Annex F to the Report of the .\'e,r Zenlnnd 
Delegation, above note 19. 
This accords with the view expressed by Burke, above note 5, 4 7. 
Above note 5, Burke, 46. 
(1986) 90 Rev Gen Int'l Pub 716 (in French); and see Burke, above note 5, 42 . 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
with the conservation or utilisation of fish stocks in the EEZ are encouraged to 
co-operate with each other and to exchange and share information that they 
have gathered concerning the conservation of fish stocks. 
The United Nations Conference on Economic Development's Rio Declaration24 
sets out a number of principles. Principle 15 sets out the precautionary 
approach-
In order to protect the environment, the precautionary approach shall be widely 
applied by States according to their capabilities. Where there are threats of serious 
or irreversible damage, lack of full scientific certainty shall not be used as a reason 
for postponing cost-effective measures to prevent environmental degradation . 
The Chair of the United Nations Conference on Straddling Fish Stocks and 
Highly Migratory Fish Stocks noted a basis for the precautionary approach in 
UNCLOS in that fisheries managers are obliged to base their decisions on the 
best scientific information available.25 He suggested that the precautionary 
approach could be seen as a reasonable reflection of this requirement, given that 
the data available to scientists are not always sufficient for managers to act. 
There was " predictable opposition" to this approach from the distant water 
fishing nations which asserted that UNCED intended that the precautionary 
approach should apply only to matters such as pollution 26 
There is some justification for the argument of the distant water fishing nations 
in the report of the Preparatory Committee for UNCED, which referred to the 
precautionary principle in the context of marine pollution and not that of living 
marine resources .27 However, although the precaution<!ry principle was 
originally developed in relation to pollution, it has taken on a wider application 
in recent years .28 Principle 15 is expressed broadly in a way which may suppo r1 
June 1992. (1992) 31 ILM 87-L 
Report of the New Zealand Delegation, above note 19, 1 J. 
Report of the New Zealand Delegation , above note J 9, 11. 
Official Records of the General Assembly, Fort_v-Six1h Session, Supple111ent 1\ ·o -18 
(A/46/48). 
Warwick Gullett "Environmental Protection and the ·Precautionary Principle ': A Response 
to Scientific Uncertainty in Environmental Management" (1997) 14 EPLJ 52. 55 . Gullet! 
comments that "[the principle has been advanced most successfully in relation to marine 
9 
10 
29 
30 
31 
its application beyond the area of pollution without straining the language. 
Indeed, fisheries management lends itself to the application of the precautionary 
approach as reliable information about fish stocks is often lacking, yet it is 
essential to the management of fisheries on a sustainable basis. Hewison argues 
that the formulation "best scientific evidence available" permits States to apply 
the precautionary approach in determining conservation measures.29 
3 Maximum sustainable yield 
The conservation and management measures that States are required to 
undertake to protect fish stocks from over-exploitation are to be designed to 
maintain and restore populations of harvested fish species to levels at which 
they are able to produce the maximum sustainable yield (MSY), as qualified by 
relevant environmental and economic factors "MSY" is not defined in 
UNCLOS. 
There has been some debate as to whether the word "maximum" qualifies 
"sustainable" or "yield", that is, whether sustainability is to be maximised or 
yield is to be maximised . The New Zealand Fishing Industry Board argues that 
"maximum" qualifies yield not sustainability. This accords with the judgment of 
Gallen J in Greenpeace New Zealand Inc v the Minister of Fisheries and 
others30 and is consistent with the grammar of the phrase. If "maximum" 
qualified "sustainable", it would be correctly expressed as an adverb, viz 
"maximally". In Greenpeace, Gallen J considered the meaning of "MSY" as 
used in the Fisheries Act 1983 , and described it as "the maximum production 
which can be obtained on an indefinitely sustained basis · from a par1icular 
stock" .3 1 
pollution, but has also been applied to areas including hazardous wastes, climate change, 
ozone depletion, biodiversity, fisheries management and general environmental 
management." He gives a number of examples of the principle being applied in relation to 
general environmental management, including Principle 15 of the Rio Declaration . 
Above note 7, Hewison, 359-360. He also cites United Nations General Assembly Resolution 
44/225 recommending a moratorium on driftnet fishing on the high seas as an example of 
the precautionary approach. 
HC Wellington, Gallen J, 27 November 1995, CP 492/93. 
Above note 30, 19. 
32 
33 
34 
35 
Hewison interprets "MSY" as - 32 
the amount of fish that can be taken on a sustained basis without diminishing the 
species' reproductive capacity or without adversely affecting associated or 
dependent species. 
The essence of these definitions is that whatever the level of exploitation of a 
stock, that stock must be able to continue to be a viable part of its ecosystem 
indefinitely. At the extreme, Burke proposes a definition which would allow a 
coastal State to exploit the stocks in its EEZ to a point just "short of 
endangering the resource" where this is in the interests of the coastal State. 33 
Qualified MSY may also be described as optimum sustainable yield (OSY) or 
optimum yield (OY) . Iverson34 defines OY as the yield that -
1. will provide the greatest overall benefit to the nation, with particular 
reference to food production and recreational opportunity; and 
2 . is presented on the basis of MSY from such fishery as modified by relevant 
economic, social or ecological factors . 
(a) "As q11al[fied by .. . ·· 
The words "as qualified by relevant environmental and economic factors" 
provide a basis for harvesting fish at rates other than MSY .35 The economic 
factors which qualify MSY specifically include the economic needs of coastal 
fishing _ communities and the special requirements of developing States. The 
formulation "relevant environmental and economic factors" is extremely broad . 
Any conceivable environmental or economic factor may justi fy a depa11ure from 
MSY where it is relevant . In addition, other factors are to be taken into 
account, viz -
• fishing patterns; 
Above note 7 Hewison, 360. 
Above note 5, Burke, 55 . 
Above note 19, Iverson, 245 . 
Eugene Buck United Nations Convention on the Lm1· of the Sea: Living Resources 
Provisions (Committee for the National Institute for the Environment, Washington DC 
1994), 2. 
1 l 
36 
12 
• the interdependence of stocks; and 
• any generally recommended international minimum standards, whether 
subregional, regional, or global. 
It is not clear from article 61 (3) whether these three factors are examples of the 
environmental factors which may qualify MSY, or whether they affect the 
design of the conservation and management measures which are to produce 
MSY. They are prefaced by the phrase "and taking into account" which 
suggests that even if relevant they may not actually qualify MSY . Of the three 
factors, "generally recommended international minimum standards" would fall 
into neither of the categories of factors which may qualify MSY and so it 
appears more likely that all three factors are relevant to the design of the 
conservation and management measures . 
In Greenpeace, Gallen J considered the meaning of "as qualified by" as it was 
used in the 1983 Act. He found that the general obligations of States under 
article 61 are " to some extent limited by the specific considerations set out in 
article 61(3)" . However, the context of the 1983 Act was quite different from 
that of the 1996 Act. 
(b) "Fish;ng patterns ,. 
The use of the expression "fishing patterns" appears to acknowledge that people 
who have traditionally fished in certain fishing grounds in a certain way should 
be considered as they are likely to be affected by the, setting of TA Cs for stocks 
traditionally fished by them . Fishing patterns would include location, target 
stocks, methods, and seasons, as well as who was fishing 36 As well , fishing 
patterns may constitute social and cultural factors in some circumstances and 
there may be an overlap with the concept of the "economic needs of coastal 
fishing communities". 
Above note 7, Hewison 364. 
37 
38 
(c) "Interdependence of stocks" 
"Interdependent" implies a mutually beneficial relationship between a target 
stock and another stock, both of which fishers seek to exploit. The use of the 
term "stocks" suggests that this phrase describes a relationship between two or 
more harvested species, rather than bringing into consideration a harvested 
species' interdependence with one that is not harvested . 
(d) Generally recommended international minimum standards 
The phrase "generally recommended international minimum standards" amounts 
to something less than customary international law; presumably being a 
reference to non binding standards or guidelines. That such standards are 
generally recommended would be sufficient to require a State to take them into 
account, even if that State did not accept them itself The Food and Agriculture 
Organisation's Code of Conduct for Responsible Fishing may fall within the 
category of generally recommended international m1111mum 
,7 standards. -
Hewison suggests that such standards might include "standards relating to gear 
type, vessel construction, flagging, labor standards, reporting requirements, and 
penalties for violations" . 38 
4 Implementation of the conservation and manageme/11 measures 
(a) "Associated and dependent species " 
Article 61 ( 4) requires a State taking conservation and management measures 
under paragraph (2) -
to take into consideration the effects on species associated with or dependent on 
harvested species with a vie,Y to maintaining or restoring populations of such 
associated or dependent species above levels at which their reproduction may 
become seriously threatened. 
This implies that the conservation and management measures will already have 
been determined and designed, but that they must be implemented in a way 
International Conference on Responsible Fishing, Canct'.m, 6-8 May l 992 (NConf.151/ 15) 
Above note 7, Hewison, 365 . 
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which considers the effects of fishing on associated or dependent species. 
Particular fishing methods, for example, may be more likely to result in bycatch 
of non-harvested species than others. The use of driftnets to catch tuna in the 
South Pacific is a good example as that method was particularly dangerous for 
species of dolphin and was ultimately banned altogether . The phrase "above 
levels at which their reproduction may become seriously threatened" may have 
been designed with marine mammals in mind. Marine mammals generally do 
not reproduce at the rate of most fish; they mature slowly and , as has been 
discussed above, they are particularly vulnerable to some fishing methods, such 
as the use of driftnets. 
However, the use of "seriously" to modify "threatened" suggests that the 
associated or dependent species may be permitted to suffer the effects of fishing 
even to the point where their reproduction is threatened , but just short of it 
being seriously threatened . This does not appear to be a very strong indication 
of the need to protect threatened or other non-target species. 
The use of the word "species" in the phrase "associated or dependent species" 
rather than " stock" implies that the species referred to are not just those which 
are the target of fishing but include those taken as bycatch and those that suffer 
other effects from the fishing of target stocks, such as the loss of a food source. 
By_ contrast, use of the word "stock" in combination with " interdependence" 
addresses the relationship between harvested species . 
Hewison, in discussing the equivalent provision relating to the high seas (article 
119) argues that this requirement should be read together with article l 19(l)(a) 
(duty to take into account the interdependence of stocks) and article 120 
(conservation and management of marine mammal s in the high seas) 
"Associated species" may include incidental by-catch rather than just those 
species which are associated with the target species biologically or those in 
some way associated with the target species through the activity of fishing 39 
WT Burke United States Fishery Manage111ent 76 Am J Jnt ' l L 2-l note 3 l , as quoted in note 
250 ofHewison, above note 7 366. 
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The term "dependent species" covers those that feed on the target species or 
have some other ecologically dependent relationship with the target species. 
5 Obligation to promote the objective of optimum utilisahon of the living 
resources 40 
The use aspect of a coastal State's obligations is dealt with in article 62. The 
coastal State is required "to promote the objective of optimum utilisation" of 
the living resources of the EEZ, but without prejudice to article 61. This means 
that article 61 contains the primary obligation and that where there is a conflict 
with the obligation under article 62, the provisions of article 61 will prevail-1 1 
However, as "conservation" encompasses "use", albeit "wise use" there may be 
no conflict with article 61. 
Use of the word "optimum" can be contrasted with "maximum" in MSY. 
Maximum utilisation is not the objective, rather, "optimum" has a sense of 
"best" or "most advantageous" suggesting that the level of use which is to be 
promoted is that which is likely to ensure a supply of fish indefinitely, and 
therefore suggesting that it may have the same meaning as "sustainable 
utilisation". Such supply of fish would also be in the long-term best interests of 
the coastal State. In any case, it is the coastal State which must determine what 
is the optimum level of utilisation and which is the best judge of its own long-
and short-term interests. Use of "optimum" imports an element of subjectivity 
on the part of the coastal State, allowing it discretion in setting the target 
Burke finds the choice of "optimum" over "maximum" significant because the 
fishery provisions of the 1982 Convention generally follow the structure of the 
United States' proposal but differ from it in this specific instance -1 2 
Article 62. 
Burke puts it thus - "This means tliat coastal State ' s authority under article 61 is not 
affected by any obligation in respect of optimum utilisation." Above note .5 . 6 l . 
Above note 5, Burke, 60. The United States proposed maximum utilisation and equitable 
allocation, requiring access for foreign fishing vessels under reasonable conditions to that 
portion of the allowable catch not harvested by the coastal State: see Burke. 36. 
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The obligation under article 62(1) does not require optimum utilisation to be 
achieved, it is an objective - something to strive towards. 
6 Foreign access to the smplus 
The implications of the coastal State having sovereign rights in its EEZ are 
important in the context of article 62(2) and the access of foreign States to the 
living resources of the EEZ. Burke argues that coastal States have the final 
authority to determine how foreign access to the living resources of the EEZ 
should be handled .43 The rights of the coastal State are also "exclusive" in its 
EEZ to the extent that only that State may determine what conservation and 
management measures may be implemented, and to what extent the living 
resources may be utilised . 
Article 62(2) provides the basis for the coastal State to provide other States 
with access to the living resources of its EEZ, where the coastal State has 
determined that it does not have the capacity to harvest the whole allowable 
catch. Although article 62(2) is expressed in mandatory terms, it is effectively 
up to the coastal State to determine what is its capacity to harvest the fish 
stocks in its EEZ and , therefore, whether there is a surplus. Where the coastal 
State determines that it cannot harvest the entire allowable catch, it is required 
to give access to the surplus of the allowable catch to other States " through 
agreements or other arrangements and pursuant to the terms, conditions, laws 
and regulations referred to in [article 62(4))" . However, no particular State has 
a right to be granted access to that surplus . Hey argues that thi s is because it is 
the coastal State that is the judge of the conservation measures to be taken , 
whether there is a surplus, and what is its size; and the coastal State may choose 
which States to allow access to the surplus . 44 
Above note 5, Burke, 39 . 
Ellen Hey, The Regime for Lhe Exploitation of Transboundarv Marine Fisheries Resources 
(Martinus NijhofT Publishers, Dordrecht , I 989) 4 7. 
45 
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Arguably, the broad discretion of coastal States in setting the allowable catch, 
determining its capacity and allocating access to any surplus is balanced by the 
obligation of States party to an international treaty to implement the treaty in 
good faith (pacta sunt servanda) . O'Connell comments - 45 
The coastal State could hardly be allowed to say that there is no surplus when, 
manifestly it does not have the capacity to harvest the entire allowable catch . 
Article 300 provides -
States Parties shall fulfil in good faith the obligations assumed under this 
Convention and shall exercise the rights, jurisdiction and freedoms recognised in 
this Convention in a manner which would not constitute an abuse of right. 
The duty to act in good faith is reinforced by article 56(2) which requires the 
coastal State to have due regard to the rights and duties of other States and to 
act in a manner compatible with the provisions of the Convention, although 
O'Connell sees article 56(2) as "too abstract to be a curb on unreasonable 
conditions" .46 An arbitrary refusal to determine allowable catch, harvesting 
capacity and to allocate surplus will constitute a breach of the Convention, even 
though a dispute concerning these decisions of the coastal State may not be 
submitted to compulsory dispute settlement. Article 297(3 )(b) provides for 
such disputes to be submitted to non-binding conciliation under Annex V of the 
Convention. Although a coastal State cannot be made to act reasonably in the 
exercise of its discretionary powers, the effect of articles 56(2), 297(3) and 300 
taken together is that clearly a coastal State is under an obligation to act in good 
faith. 
Factors which are relevant to the coastal State's decision to give access to any 
surplus to other States include 
• the significance of the fish stocks of the area to the economy of the coastal 
State concerned and its other national interests; 
DP O ' Connell The Jnterna1ional Law of the Sea (ed IA Shearer, vol l Clnrcndon Press. 
Oxford, 1982) 563 . 
Above note 45, O'Connell , 566. 
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• the provisions of articles 69 and 70 as to landlocked and geographically 
disadvantaged States; 
• the requirements of developing States II1 the subregion or region II1 
harvesting part of the surplus; and 
• the need to minimise economic dislocation II1 States whose nationals 
habitually fished in the EEZ or which have made substantial efforts in 
research and identification of stocks. 
Before any foreign State's fishing fleets may obtain access to fisheries in the 
EEZ of a coastal State, the coastal State must make a number of decisions 
based on the "best scientific evidence available". First, it must consider whether 
an allowable catch should be set for the stock in question, then, if an allowable 
catch is to be set, it must determine the allowable catch. lt must also decide 
whether other conservation and management measures are warranted . Having 
established an allowable catch, the coastal State must then determine the 
capacity of its fishing vessels to fish the stock and on that basis determine 
whether there is any surplus stock which may be allocated to foreign vessels . 
Once the existence of a surplus has been established, the coastal State may enter 
into agreements or arrangements with other States as to the conditions of 
access. The right of other States generally to share in any surplus is contingent 
on .their acceptance of the laws of the coastal State. 
Regardless of the special circumstances of a particular State, nationals of that 
and other States must comply with the conservation measures and laws of the 
coastal State which regulate fishing in the EEZ. Article 62( 4) provides an 
extensive, but non-exhaustive, list of the matters which a coastal State may 
provide for in its laws. These domestic laws of the coastal State are required to 
be consistent with the provisions of UNCLOS, and a coastal State must give 
due notice of its conservation and management laws and regulations . 
47 
Access by foreign fishing fleets to any surplus living resources is very much a 
matter of negotiation between those States wanting access and the coastal 
State. If particular States are unable to agree on the conditions of access, or if a 
fishing State considers the coastal State's laws onerous to the point of being 
unreasonable, it may be that the coastal State is in breach of UN CLOS by failing 
to act in good faith . However, whether or not the coastal State is in breach of 
its obligations, there is no recourse to compulsory dispute resolution under the 
Convention. 47 
Article 297 provides no compulsory mechanism for resolving disputes relating to access to 
fish in the EEZ, although non-binding conciliation is available: see (2 97(3)(b)). Refer also 
to note 5 above, Balton at 142 and Burke at 4 7. 
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C Marine Mammals48 
Articles 61 and 62 provide the general regime for the conservation, management 
and use of the living resources of the EEZ. Articles 63 to 67 contain provisions 
specific to straddle stocks, 49 highly migratory species, marine mammals, 
d k 50 d d . 5 I S d ana romous stoc s , an cata romous species . e entary species are 
specifically excluded from the ambit of Part V of the Convention .52 
I Special provisfon for marine mammals 
There are some 116 species of marine mammals, 7 5 of which are cetaceans. 53 
Cetaceans include whales, dolphins and porpoises . The Convention makes 
specific provision for marine mammals, perhaps in recognition of the fact that 
they are not fish and of the affinity that humans have for them . s.i The United 
States was a forceful advocate for the protection of marine mammals, 55 
reflecting the strong public opinion in the United States in favour of protecting 
marine mammals . 
Article 65 makes it clear that coastal States may prohibit , limit or regulate the 
exploitation of marine mammals more strictly than otherwise provided for in 
Part V. By implication, coastal States may not regulate less strictly than 
Article 65. 
' "Straddle" stocks is a short hand expression which covers what article 63 calls '·stocks 
occurring within the [EEZ] of two or more coastal States or both within the [EEZJ and in an 
area beyond and adjacent to it". 
"Anadromous" fish are those which ascend rivers to spawn. 
"Catadromous" fish arc those which descend to lo,,·er river or sea to spmrn . 
Article 68. 
Cynthia E Carlson. 'The International Regulation of Small Cetaceans" 21 San Diego L Re,· 
577, 580. 
Cynthia Carlson comments that "as marine mammals are biologically different from other 
living marine resources (a term which generally refers to fishery resources). this article 
indicates a widespread recognition within the international community of the special 
characteristics of marine mammals", above note 53 ,602. 
Article 65 was drafted after article 64, and was amended later to clari~y that the article ,,as 
"never intended to permit less restrictive limitations or regulation of the c.\ploitation of 
marine mammals than would be required by the Convention if there were no such article. 
and to direct particular attention to the need for appropriate organisational agreements for 
the protection of cetaceans" . Oxman as quoted in Carlson, above note 53. 60-l . 
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provided for in Part V. Based on the drafting history of articles 64 and 65 5
6 and 
because article 65 is specific to marine mammals, Carlson favours article 65 as 
being intended to govern the regulation of marine mammals, rather than article 
64. Article 64 does apply generally to highly migratory species, however, 
"highly migratory species" is defined in article 64 by reference to Annex I of the 
Convention, which contains a list of highly migratory species including some 
. l . s1 manne mamma species . Carlson does not adequately resolve the conflict 
between articles 64 and 65 . Arguably, article 65 is authority for a State to 
withdraw marine mammals from the ambit of articles 61, 62, and 64, but if it 
does not do so, those articles will continue to apply. 
58 
Article 65 enJoms States to co-operate with each other with a view to 
conserving manne mammals . This obligation probably reflects the highly 
migratory behaviour of many species of marine mammals which therefore come 
within the jurisdictions of a number of States as well as traversing the high seas. 
Article 61 ( 4), which requires States to consider the effects of fishing on species 
associated or dependent on the target species, must also be considered m 
relation to marine mammals. Hewison suggests that the term .. associated or 
dependent species" includes finfish , marine mammals, marine birds, and other 
marine wildlife such as turtles. These species are associated with target stocks 
in the sense of being caught along with some stocks. He also comments that the 
"emerging principles relating to the protection of biodiversity in the marine 
environment reinforce 'the obligation not to seriously threaten these species" 
59 
Populations of marine mammals are especially susceptible to being reduced to a 
level which could endanger their reproduction because of their lovv reproductive 
rates, slow maturation, and relatively long life-spans . Marine mammals are 
Above note 55 . 
Dolphins and cetaceans are included at items 15 and 17 respectively. 
Churchill and Lowe comment " in the case of marine mammals .. . the coastal State is entitled 
to limit or prohibit the exploitation of such species, rather than establishing a total allowable 
catch and promoting the objective of optimum utlization": RR Churchill and AV Lowe The 
Law of the Sea (Manchester University Press, Manchester. 1985) 208 . 
Above note 7 Hewison, at 366 note 247 . 
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caught in a number of ways, viz as the target species, as incidental (but still 
possibly intended) bycatch, and accidentally. The effects of fishing that could be 
a threat to marine mammals are not restricted to the actual catching of marine 
mammals whether intentionally or otherwise; they are also put at risk by being 
deprived of sources of food where they feed on target species. 60 
2 Cetaceans 
In respect of cetaceans, article 65 requlfes States to work through the 
appropriate international organisations for their conservation, management and 
study. 
The International Whaling Commission (IWC) is widely accepted as being the 
appropriate international organisation in respect of large whales 6 1 Its mandate 
to protect other cetaceans is less certain, even though there is no definition of 
"whale" in the International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling 1946 
(the Whaling Convention) which established the Commission. The Whaling 
Convention applies to "all waters" in which whaling activities take place. This 
raises the issue of whether the IWC has jurisdiction over whales in the EEZs of 
coastal States. 62 Carlson argues that if article 65 is read with article 120 - 63 
it appears as if article 65 authorises international organisations to set minimum 
standards for the conservation and management of marine mammals throughout 
their migratory range, both within and beyond the EEZ of a signatory State .6•1 
The IWC was established to protect and manage whale stocks for the benefit of 
the whaling industry. However, it has evolved into a more conservation-
oriented organisation .65 In the light of its original focus on managing large 
whales for exploitation, it is unclear whether it has the mandate to protect and 
Above note 7 Hewison at 367 . 
Above note 53 , Carlson at 589; and Churchill and Lowe, above note 50. at 208 . 
Above note 53 , Carlson at 604 . 
Article 120 provides "Article 65 also applies to the conservation and management of marine 
mammals in the high seas". 
Above note 53, Carlson at 606. Emphasis in original. 
Above note 53, Carlson at 578. 
66 
67 
68 
69 
manage all whales as well as other cetaceans by whatever means they are 
caught. Carlson notes that the IWC is considered to be the appropriate 
international body for regulation of direct takes, rather than incidental takes, and 
suggests that a regional fisheries organisation would be the appropriate body in 
respect of incidental takes, especially of small cetaceans.
66 The United States' 
view prior to its signing of UNCLOS appears to have been that it should 
exercise its sovereign rights with respect to the taking of marine mammals in its 
EEZ in a way which was no less restrictive than the international standards.
67 
The United States also acknowledged the IWC as the appropriate body in 
respect of cetaceans. In 1981, the IWC members agreed that the Whaling 
Convention was "flexible enough to provide for management of all cetacean 
populations". 68 However, as mentioned above, this jurisdiction probably relates 
to direct takes only. 
In 1982, the IWC announced a moratorium on all commercial whaling activities 
with effect from 1986, by setting catch limits at zero . 
3 Regional fisheries organisations 
The South Pacific has two regional fisheries organisations - the South Pacific 
Forum Fisheries Agency (SPFFA) and the South Pacific Commission (SPC). 
New Zealand is a member of both organisations, the former being comprised of 
South Pacific nations and territories, and the latter including as well the United 
States, the United Kingdom and France. In 1989 the SPFF A issued the Tarawa 
Declaration condemning the use of driftnets in the South Pacific, which was 
endorsed by the SPC. The Tarawa Declaration was expressly based on 
UNCLOS. 69 Prior to the coming into force of the Wellington Driftnet 
Above note 53 , Carlson note 113. p 606 . 
Letter R Eisenbud, General Counsel , Marine Mammals Commission (3 I March 1983 ). as 
quoted in Carlson, above note 53 , at 603 , note 114,. 
Report of the Preparatory Meeting to Improve and Update the International Com·ention on 
the Regulation of Whaling, 1946 (Reykjavik, May 1981) IWC/33/20 (1981). as quoted in 
Carlson at 617, above note 53 . 
Particularly articles 63, 64, 87, 116, 117, 118 and 119. 
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Convention 1989, 70 Mitchell commented that "incidental captures, mainly by 
purse seines, gill nets, and the like, appear to account for the greatest number of 
cetaceans killed at the present time". 71 
The driftnet fishing issue demonstrates the ability of the South Pacific States to 
act in a concerted regional way to address what they recognise as a regional 
issue. 
D Summary of coastal States' obligations under UNCLOS 
(a) Allowable catch 
The coastal State has the sole right to determine the allowable catch for such of 
the living resources of its EEZ as are commercially harvested and which it 
considers would benefit from a restriction on catch levels . lt is not obliged to set 
an allowable catch for all the living resources of its EEZ; rather, it has a 
discretion in determining for which stocks it will set an allowable catch. 
However, the coastal State is not entitled to exercise its discretionary powers in 
an arbitrary manner. 
The determination of the allowable catch is only one of the "proper 
conservation and management measures" which a coastal State may employ. 
There are no specific restrictions on the measures that may be employed for 
conservation and management purposes . As with the determination of the 
allowable catch, the coastal State alone has the right to determine 
what other proper conservation and management measures it will take . 
The Convention for the Prohibition of Fishing with Long Driftnets in the South Pacific 
opened for signature at Wellington November 1989. 29 ILM 14~9 ( 1990) In force from 
May 1991. 
E Mitchell, Porpoise, Dolphin and Small Whale Fisheries of the World· S1a1us and 
Problems, (8 IUCN Monograph No 3, 1975) as quoted in Carlson at 583. abo,·c note 53 . 
(b) Maximum sustainable yield 
The obligation imposed on coastal States by article 61 (2) may be simplified as -
to ensure through proper conservation and management measures that the living 
resources of the EEZ are not over-exploited. 
MSY represents the quantity of fish that can be taken on a sustained basis 
without endangering the viability of the stock. One of the objects of the 
conservation and management measures is the maintenance and restoration of 
populations of harvested fish species at, or to, levels at which they are able to 
produce MSY as qualified by relevant environmental and economic factors . The 
qualifying factors transform MSY into the optimum sustainable yield, that 1s 
MSY modified on the basis of relevant environmental and economic factors . 
Article 61(3) also provides for some other factors to be taken into account. 
These factors may not always have the effect of modifying MS Y even where 
they are relevant. Of them, only the interdependence of stocks could be 
interpreted as an environmental factor. Fishing patterns and generally 
recommended international minimum standards are neither environmental nor 
economic factors, although the former term may overlap with the concept of the 
"economic needs of coastal fishing communities" in some limited instances. 
(c) Optimum utilisation 
The obligation of a coastal State to promote the objective of optimum utilisation 
of the EEZ's living resources is secondary to its obligation to prevent over-
exploitation. The two obligations are not incompatible. "Optimum utilisation" 
is clearly not the same thing as "maximum utilisation", ·but is more like 
"sustainable utilisation". The use of the word "over-exploitati on" in a11icle 61 
indicates that some exploitation or use is contemplated. 
(d) Foreign access 
Having determined the allowable catch under article 61 (1 ), a coastal State is 
required to determine its capacity to harvest the allowable catch under article 
62(2). Where it determines that it does not have the capacity to harvest the 
25 
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entire allowable catch, the coastal State is required to enter into agreements 
giving other States, but not specific other States, access to the surplus . Should 
a State act unreasonably in the performance of its obligations under UN CLOS, 
it may be in breach of the Convention, although its decisions are not susceptible 
to compulsory binding dispute settlement. 
(e) Protection of marine species 
In the implementation, rather than the design, of the conservation and 
management measures, a coastal State has obligations relating to the protection 
of associated or dependent species . Dependent species are generally those 
considered to be ecologically related to the target species, including non-fish 
species such as marine mammals and seabirds . However, other species may be 
associated with the target species in such a way that causes them to be taken as 
bycatch. The protection of associated and dependent species promoted by 
article 61 ( 4) is not absolute protection; rather the size of populations of 
associated and dependent species must not be allowed to fall to levels at which 
their reproduction may become seriously threatened . ln addition , it is 
specifically provided that coastal States may provide greater protection for 
marine mammals than that provided for in UNCLOS. The IWC appears to be 
generally accepted as having jurisdiction over the management of all cetaceans, 
however, its jurisdiction in respect of those taken incidentally is unclear. 
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II NEW ZEALAND'S LEGISLATION 
New Zealand's fisheries legislation encompasses the Fisheries Acts 1983 and 
1996, which regulate the activity of fishing, and, from the conservation 
perspective, a number of Acts which regulate activities affecting the sea and its 
living resources . 
A Development of New Zealand's fisheries legislatio11 
Until 1965, New Zealand had a 3 mile territorial sea, established by the Fisheries 
Act 1908 .72 In 1965, New Zealand passed the Territorial Sea and Fishery Zone 
Act73 claiming a 9 mile fishery zone in addition to its territorial sea. The 
extension was intended to offer protection and assistance to the New Zealand 
fishing industry- "to reserve 12 miles of sea for New Zealand fishermen" 74 
In 1977, New Zealand enacted the Territorial Sea and Exclusive Economic 
Zone Act, 75 which established New Zealand's 200 mile EEZ, as well as 
providing for the delimitation of New Zealand's territorial sea . The Act made 
provision for the exploration and exploitation, and conservation and 
management of the resources of the EEZ, using the wording of article 56 of the 
draft UNCLOS. The seas of the EEZ were characterised as New Zealand 
-
fisheries waters with the Fisheries Act 1983 and the Marine Mammals 
Protection Act 1978 applying 
76 
Section 2 defined '·waters" or "Ne,,· Zealand waters" as the sea within one marine league of 
the coast of New Zealand . 
1965, No 11. 
Speech of Prime Minister. Keith Holyoake. NZPD , no 3-D. p 1842. 11 August 196:i . 
The title of this Act was amended in 1996 to the Territorial Sea. Contiguous Zone. and 
Exclusive Economic Zone Act. 
Section 10, Territorial Sea, Contiguous Zone, and Exclusive Economic Zone Act. 
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The Territorial Sea and Exclusive Economic Zone Act requires the Minister of 
Fisheries to determine from time to time the total allowable catch (TAC) for 
every fishery within the EEZ, including the portion of each TAC that New 
Zealand fishing craft have the capacity to harvest. Any surplus in the TAC is to 
be allocated to foreign fishing craft. The Act contains provisions setting out the 
licensing regime for foreign fishing craft, but does not provide any guidance on 
the calculation of the TAC. The provisions of this Act which deal with the 
setting of TAC and the licensing of foreign fishing craft will be repealed by the 
Fisheries Act 1996 when the relevant substitute provision comes into force. 77 
Since the extension of the EEZ to 200 miles, New Zealand has developed a 
deep sea fishing industry within that area, which had previously been fished 
indiscriminately by distant water fishing nations such as Japan. 78 However, the 
"New Zealandisation" of fishing combined with the declaration of the EEZ did 
not halt overfishing. New Zealand's National Report to UNCED Forging the 
Links, records that - 79 
[o)verfishing became common place in some New Zealand waters during the 1970s 
as a result of a major expansion of the industry. By the early 1980s. inshore fish 
catches had declined drastically . 
The Fisheries Act 1983 purported to consolidate and reform the law relating to 
management and conservation of fisheries and fishery resources within New 
Zealand and New Zealand fisheries waters. In 1986, as a response to the great 
reduction in New Zealand's fish stocks which had occurred since the extension 
of the EEZ and the development of the New Zealand fishing industry, an 
amendment to the Fisheries Act 1983 introduced the quota management system 
(QMS) to New Zealand's fisheries management. The purpose of the QMS was 
to "conserve the major fish stocks and improve the economic efficiency of the 
fishing industry". 80 In 1990, a joint report by the Controller and Auditor-
Section 314(2)(a) Fisheries Act 1996 is to be brought into force by Order in Council. 
Above note 45, O'Connell 535. note 131. 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Wellington, 1991) 59. 
Spencer, Chris and Brian Ballantyne New Zealand's EEZ 111andme: fishing ups & resource 
management opportunities for the hydrographic surveyor (Paper presented to the 37 th 
Australian Surveyors Congress 13-19 April 1996, Perth , Western Australict) . 
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General and the Parliamentary Commissioner for the Environment described the 
QMS as being "designed to maximise the economic return without damage to 
the resource base" .81 Since 1991, the QMS has been under review. Many of 
the review group's recommendations have been enacted in the Fisheries Act 
1996. 
At the time of writing, New Zealand has two Fisheries Acts partially in force , 
viz the 1983 Act and the 1996 Act. The 1996 Act is being brought into force 
by Order in Council on a progressive basis . As it is brought into force, it 
progressively replaces the equivalent parts of the 1 983 Act. 
82 The main 
provisions of the 1996 Act which are in force contain the philosophy of the 
Act, 83 deal with taiapure and customary fishing , 
8
~ and provide for cost 
85 d d . . . 86 I b f l . recovery an a m1111strat1on . T 1e su stance o t 1e revised QMS has not 
been brought into force and the 1983 Act provisions continue to apply. 
However, the Fisheries (Transitional Provisions) Regulations 1996
87 modify the 
operation of the 1983 Act to some extent pending the coming into force of 
certain of the provisions of the 1996 Act . 
B The Fisheries Act 199688 
The purpose of the Fisheries Act is proclaimed in s 8 as " to provide for the 
utilisation of fisheries resources while ensuring sustainability" . Section 8(2) 
defines "ensuring sustainability" and "utilisation" as follows -
"Ensuring sustainability" means -
(a) Maintaining the potential of fisheries resources to meet Ihc reasonabl:, 
foreseeable needs of future genera tions: and 
Jvfarine Fisheries Manage111e111 - .-1 Join t Report of !he Controller and . ..J ud11or-Ge11eral and 
the Parliamentary Commissioner/or th e E11viron111 enl (Wellington. 1990) 3. 
Three commencement orders have been made to date, vi z I 9961235. 1996/255 and 1997/-W 
bringing various provisions into force on 23 /8/96, 1/10/96 and l /-'+ /97 rcspecti\ ely . 
Parts I Preliminary, II Purpose and Principles and III Sustainability Measures. 
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(b) Avoiding, remedying, or mitigating any adverse effects of fishing on the 
aquatic environment." 
"Utilisation" means conserving, using, enhancing. and developing fisheries 
resources to enable people to provide for their social , economic, and cultural well-
being. 
There was much debate when the Fisheries Bill was being considered by the 
Primary Production Committee of Parliament as to how exactly the purpose of 
the Bill should be expressed. Notwithstanding the debate over the distinction 
between "sustainable management" and "utilisation of fisheries resources while 
ensuring sustainability", it appears that, in practice, the Ministry of Fisheries 
considers both expressions to have the same meaning. In a recent statement , 
Warwick Tuck, the Chief Executive of the Ministry of Fisheries, commented 
that - 89 
The Ministry of Fisheries has, as its primary focus, the sustainable management of 
New Zealand's fisheries resources .... The Fisheries Act clearly enunciates this 
concept of sustainable management, described in the Act as sustainable utilisation. 
This concept underpins everything in the Act from the setting of catch le,·els to the 
interaction of the Ministry with stakeholders and user groups. 
This appears to be somewhat at odds with the intention of the then Minister of 
Fisheries as expressed in a written statement on the introduction of the Fisheries 
Bill into the House. 90 In that statement, the Hon Doug Kidd said -
As the words '"sustainable utilisation" imply, the Bill is to become a statute dealing 
with utilisation. This means that the Fisheries Act will no longer be a ,·chicle that 
can be used to give total protection to marine species and areas . 
To ensure that total protection of marine species and areas can continue to be 
afforded, the bill contains amendments to the conserYation statutes to enable them 
to fulfil this role in the marine environment. Such a di,·ision bet\\een total 
protection and utilisation is highly desirous. lt requires decisions on the ah,·ays 
Ministry of Fisheries Fisheries Act 1996 (http://www.fish.go\i.nzJfish_act/foreword .htm) 
Written statement of the Minister of Fisheries, 6 December 1994. copy on file in the office of 
the Parliamental)' Commissioner for the Environment. 
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present conflict between use and conservation to be made with all costs and benefits 
identified. 
A number of terms are used in the Act to describe the "living resources" of the 
sea.91 The distinction between two of them, "fisheries resources" and "aquatic 
life" is not clear as each is defined to include all conceivable marine life, 
although different formulations are used. Both terms are incorporated in the 
definition of "ensuring sustainability"; "fisheries resources" expressly in 
paragraph (a) and "aquatic life" through the reference to the "aquatic 
environment", which includes all aquatic life. Both terms would appear to be 
synonyms for marine " living resources", which is the expression used in 
UNCLOS. 
The purpose of the Act should not be considered in isolation. The Act was 
intended to recognise New Zealand ' s obligations under UNCLOS and other 
international instruments, most notably the Biodiversity Convention, the 
Wellington Driftnet Convention, and the Convention for Conservat io n of 
Southern Bluefin Tuna.92 Since enactment, New Zealand has al so concluded 
the Convention on Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks. 
The Act also sets out a number of environmental principles93 and information 
principles94 which are to guide the manner in which the functi ons, duties, or 
powers provided for under the Act are to be exercised . The environmental 
principles incorporate New Zealand ' s international obligations unde r UNCLOS 
and the Convention on Biological Diversity.95 
Refer to s 2 which contains a number of definitions . 
Also referred to in the explanatory note to the Bill as introduced were Agreements relating 
to the Fomm Fisheries Agency, and the Treaty on Fisheries Between the GO\·ernments of 
certain Pacific Island States and the Government of the United States of America . 
Section 9. 
Section 10. 
Ministry of Fisheries, above note 89. 
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The environmental principles to be taken into account are -
(a) Associated or dependant species96 should be maintained above a level that 
ensures their long-term viability: 
(b) Biological diversity of the aquatic environment should be maintained : 
(c) Habitat of particular significance for fisheries management should be 
protected. 
Principle (a) adopts a variation on the language of article 61(4) of UNCLOS, 
which requires the coastal State, in taking proper conservation and management 
measures, to consider the effects of the measures on species "associated or 
dependent upon harvested species with a view to maintaining or restoring 
populations of such associated and dependent species above levels at which 
their reproduction may become seriously threatened". 97 
Further guidance as to the Act's interpretation and its relationship with 
UNCLOS is provided in s 5 which requires that the 1996 Act be interpreted in a 
manner consistent with -
(a) New Zealand 's international obligations rel a ting to fi sheries: and 
(b) The provisions of the Treaty of Waitangi (Fisheries Claims) Settlement Act 
1992. 
A number of terms have been imported directly into the Act from UN CLOS, viz 
"associated or dependent species" , and "maximum sustainable yield" . Others 
have been imported in a modified form , viz "allowable catch" is referred to as 
, "total allowable catch", and "best scientific evidence available" has become 
"best available information". All of these terms are defined ins 2 of the Act . 
J The Quota Management System 
The centrepiece of New Zealand ' s fisheries management and its response to the 
problems of over-exploitation inherent in a common property resource is the 
"Associated or dependent species" means any non-harvested species taken or otherwise 
affected by the taking of any harvested species (s 2 Fisheries Act 1996 ). 
Similar wording is also found in article 119 which deals with the conservation of the living 
resources of the high seas. 
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quota management system (QMS). The QMS is a system which, in theory at 
least, recognises that the number of fish in the sea is not infinite. 98 When the 
Fisheries Bill was introduced, the Minister of Fisheries showed great faith in the 
QMS. He stated - 99 
The [individual transferable quota (ITQ)] system is the most efTective and efficient 
mechanism for fisheries management. It provides the correct incentives to 
encourage investment and is based on the realisation that if you giYe people a 
property right in a resource, they will look after it. With ownership there is a 
capital value ascribed to an asset. Many fishers haYe had to purchase their quota , so 
they now have a great respect for the fishery and an incentive to protect their 
investment. The ITQ system is the \"Cl)' reason the world ' s fisheries managers look 
to New Zealand as the leader in fisheries management. 
Under the QMS, New Zealand's EEZ is divided into a number of quota 
management areas established in relation to particular fish stocks. 100 The 
establishment of a quota management area in respect of a stock is a prerequisite 
to calculating the TAC for that stock. Species which are the subject of fisheries 
management are classified into units and referred to as stocks. 
The QMS depends on the setting of an annual TAC for stocks managed under 
that system. The TAC for any year contains the total allowable commercial 
catch (T ACC), the allowance for recreational and Maori customary non-
commercial fishing interests, the quantity required for research and the amount 
taken illegally each year. 
On the basis of their catch histories, New Zealand commercial fishing interests 
are allocated individual transferable quota (ITQ) , which is expressed as a 
percentage of the stock to which it relates . The ITQ generates an annual catch 
entitlement (ACE) in respect of the stock and quota management area for a 
specific year. The ACE confers on a quota owner an entitlement to harvest a 
quantity of a stock expressed in kilogrammes, and in accordance with a fishing 
Hon Doug Kidd, Foreword,abovc note 89. 
Above note 83. 
Section 28B, Fisheries Act 1983. 
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permit. ITQ is only allocated to persons who hold commercial fishing permits 
for the species the subject of the ITQ . The holding of both ACE and a fishing 
permit are prerequisites to commercial fishing for QMS stocks. Management of 
a fish stock under the QMS does not preclude the use of other control 
measures, such as method restrictions. 101 
The QMS is an elaborate system heavily dependant on research and scientific 
knowledge about the fish stocks and their ecosystems. For this reason, not all 
fish stocks are able to be managed under the QMS. The Ministry of Research, 
Science and Technology has commented that "of the fish stocks that form part 
of the quota management system, stock size relative to that which will produce 
maximum sustainable yield is known for only 40% of fish stocks" . 102 
In order to take fish which are not managed under the QMS, a permit is still 
required. There is currently a moratorium on the issuing of new permits for 
non-quota management stocks ( except tuna) to control the expansion of effo11 
in these fisheries until they can be brought under the QMS . 
In theory, the QMS is a system that could ensure the sustainability of New 
Zealand's fisheries resources . However, the co-operation of the fishing industry 
and individual fishing operators is essential to the success of the QMS in 
delivering sustainable fisheries . The New Zealand system is very complex to 
comply with, administer and enforce, leaving the way open to misreporting and 
overfishing. 103 As well, the fishing industry uses its lobbying power to influence 
the setting of T ACs, and the legal system to challenge decisions of the Minister 
of Fisheries in setting TAC. 10 -1 
The ACE for squid is also subject to a method restriction. 
Under Sea Wealth? (www.morst.govt.nz/RST20l0/Strt/kn0\\"l.htm) . 
The Ministry of Fisheries' strategy, Fisheries 2010, identified a number of serious risks to 
New Zealand ' s fisheries , including: depletion due to persistent over-fishing: potential long-
tenn damage to habitat caused by fishing; damage to threatened species and their habitat 
from fishing; and high levels of non-compliance with fisheries law. 
For example: Roaring Forties Seafoods Ltd v Minister of Fisheries (HC Wellington, I May 
1997, Ellis J, CP 64/97); and New Zealand Federation of Co111111ercial Fisher111en Inc and 
Others v Minister of Fisheries (HC Wellington, 15 October 1996, McGechan J. CP 237/96) . 
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2 Sustainability measures 
The Minister of Fisheries may set various measures to ensure sustainability of 
fish stocks. Part III of the 1996 Act provides a process for setting sustainability 
measures, including, matters to be taken into account, and a non-exhaustive list 
of measures which may be used to ensure sustainability. 105 The Minister is 
required to consult widely before setting any sustainability measures and to 
provide written reasons to those consulted for his decisions . 
106 
In an emergency, the Minister of Fisheries may impose such measures as he or 
she considers expedient. The emergency measures that may be imposed are
107 
• closure of an area by prohibiting the harvesting of any fisheries resources ; 
• restricting the methods that may be used to take any fisheries resources; 
• restricting the taking of any fisheries resources in any area by reference to 
the size, sex, or biological state of the resource; 
• setting or altering the fishing season for any stock in any area; 
• imposing additional reporting requirements for any stock, any area, or 
fishing method; and 
• requiring the disposal of any fisheries resources in a specified manner. 
UNCLOS authorises "other conservation measures" to be taken . These 
measures include gear restrictions, closed seasons, closed areas, protected 
species, and limited entry . New Zealand has combined a number of measures in 
its regulatory regime. In particular, New Zealand regulates its fish eries by -
• restricting the size of the catch; 
• restricting the equipment that may be used ( eg mesh sizes for nets and 
prohibition on the use of driftnets) ; 
• closure of areas; 
• closed seasons; 
• the protection of particular species; and 
Section 11 Fisheries Act. 
Section 12 Fisheries Act. 
Section 16(7) Fisheries Act. 
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• limited entry. 
The matters to which the sustainability measures may relate are consistent with 
the obligation imposed on coastal States by UNCLOS to take "proper 
conservation and management measures". The proper conservation and 
management measures authorise measures of a type similar to those listed in 
s 11 (3) of the Fisheries Act, as well as authorising the protection of species and 
limited entry into the fishing industry. New Zealand provides for the protection 
of particular species in other legislation and restricts entry into the fishing 
industry by allowing only those interests with fishing permits to take fish 
commercially. 
3 Total allowable catch and maximum sustainable yield 
Article 61 ( 1) of UN CLOS requires coastal States to determine the allowable 
catch of the living resources in their EEZs. 
As noted in part I of this paper, under UNCLOS, the conservation and 
management measures (including the setting of allowable catches) are to be 
designed to maintain and restore populations of harvested fish species to levels 
at which they are able to produce the MSY, as qualified by relevant 
environmental and economic factors . 
The Fisheries Act 1996 explicitly requires,the TAC of stocks managed under the 
QMS to be set with reference to the MSY. New Zealand ' s use of MSY as the 
goal for fisheries management has come in for some criticism from the New 
Zealand Fishing Industry Board (NZFIB) and some fisheries scientists . 108 They 
argue that MSY is an out-dated concept. The NZFIB also contends that the use 
of MSY without any qualification is contrary to international law. This 
contention was put forward with reference to clause 11 of the Fisheries Bill 
which dealt with the setting of TAC with reference to MS Y. However, clause 2 
Ray Hilborn "Two steps forward - one step back" Seafood Ne ll' Zealand (Wellington. April 
1997). 
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of the Bill defined "MSY" in such a way that it was inherently qualified by 
environmental factors, viz "the population dynamics of the stock and any 
environmental conditions that influence the stock". 109 This definition was 
carried through to s 2 of the 1996 Act; economic factors coming into play under 
s 13 in the setting of TAC for stocks whose current level is above or below, but 
not at, the MSY-producing level. 
Whereas article 61(3) requires MSY to be "qualified" by the relevant factors, 
s 2 of the 1996 Act requires the decision-maker to "have regard" to the 
population dynamics of the stock and environmental conditions. As discussed 
above, "qualified by" has the sense of limitation by the qualifying factors. The 
language of article 61 (3) is mandatory, but, this is misleading as there is such 
generous scope for the exercise of discretion by the coastal State that article 
61(3) is rendered permissive. On its face the Fisheries Act 1996 is more 
directory than mandatory; the wording "having regard to" is less strong than 
that of article 61(3) . However, there is a real requirement for the decision-
maker to turn his or her mind to the relevant environmental factors, although 
they may not be reflected in the final decision . 11 0 As noted above, the fishing 
industry has demonstrated its willingness to challenge decisions made by the 
Minister ofFisheries in the setting of TAC through judicial review proceedings. 
The TAC for a stock is to be set at a level that maintains the stock at or above a 
level which can produce the MSY or restores it to such a level. However, 
where a stock is below the MSY-producing level , a number of factors impact 
upon the setting of TAC, and justify a departure from MSY . The Minister of 
Fisheries is to have regard to the interdependence of stocks when setting the 
TAC for a stock which is at or above the MSY-producing level 11 1 ln 
determining the TAC for a stock whose current level is below that which can 
Section 2 defines "MSY", in relation to any stock, as -
the greatest yield that can be achieved over time while maintaining the stock's producti\'c 
capacity, having regard to the population dynamics of the stock and any en\' ironmenta l fac tors 
that influence the stock. 
R v CD [1976] l NZLR 436; Donnithorne v Christchurch Ci ry Council (1 99-lJ NZRMA 97 . 
Section l 3(2)(a) and (c) Fisheries Act. 
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produce MSY, the Minister of Fisheries is to have regard to the 
interdependence of stocks and any environmental conditions affecting the stock. 
As well, the TAC set must enable the stock to be restored to the MS Y -
producing level within a period appropriate to the stock and its biological 
characteristics. 112 
It is not clear how information concerning the interdependence of stocks or 
other environmental conditions affecting stocks is to impact upon the MSY or 
the level of TAC set for a stock. 
The Fisheries Bill, as introduced, envisaged that in ce11ain circumstances a TAC 
could be set consistent with a stock size below that at which MSY is produced . 
The NZFIB supported this provision, but it was opposed by environmental 
groups and does not feature in the Act. The NZFlB, in its submission on the 
revised Bill, repeated its support for this provision arguing that its inclusion was 
consistent with New Zealand ' s international obligations under UNCLOS . This 
argument was based on article 61(3) which "establishes MSY as the objective, 
but allows the objective to be qualified in accordance with specified factors". 11 ' 
The NZFIB was concerned that to ensure that there would be scope for setting 
TAC that allowed stocks to be maintained at levels below the MSY-producing 
level and it seized on the wording of article 61(3) to support its argument . 
For those stocks listed in the Third Schedule, 11 ~ a TAC may be set otherwise 
than in accordance with s 13(2). 11 5 The criteria for stocks to be 'listed in the 
Third Schedule are -
• the biological characteristics of the stock make it impossibl e to estimate 
MSY; 
Section 13(2)(b) Fisheries Act. 
Submission on the Fisheries Bill , New Zealand Fishing Industry Board. 4. 
Currently the Third Schedule applies to southern scallops in the Southern Scallop Fishery 
and squid in all quota management areas. 
Section 14 Fisheries Act, Alternative total allowable catch for stock specified in the Third 
Schedule. 
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• a catch limit for New Zealand has been determined as part of an 
international agreement; or 
• the stock is managed on a rotational or enhanced basis. 
Currently the Third Schedule applies to southern scallops in the Southern 
Scallop Fishery (an enhanced stock) and squid in all quota management 
areas (as the biological characteristics of squid mean MSY cannot be 
estimated). 
Reference to relevant economic factors which may qualify MSY as provided for 
in UN CLOS is found, along with social and cultural factors, in s 13. Section 
13(3) requires the Minister to have regard to such social, cultural, and economic 
factors as he or she considers relevant, in considering the way in which, and rate 
at which, a stock is moved towards or above a level that can produce MSY.
11 6 
The social, cultural, and economic factors do not affect MSY where the 
Minister sets a TAC that maintains the stock at or above the MSY-producing 
level under s 13(2)(a), presumably because no change to the level of the stock is 
envisaged. 
Social and cultural factors are not referred to in article 61(3) of UNCLOS . 
Burke suggests that there is "ample authority" in Part V of the Convention as a 
whole to take social factors into account even though they are not specifically 
referred to. He does not comment on cultural factors , 
117 however, it is arguable 
that cultural factors are a subset of social factors. 
Although the provisions relating to the setting of TAC based on MS Y are not 
identical to those contained in UN CLOS, the essential elements of article 61 are 
combined in a way which gives effect to the intent of article 61 . UN CLOS sets 
out the general rule for the management and conservation of fisheries in EEZs in 
only two articles taking up less than two pages. New Zealand's Fisheries Act is 
a substantial enactment of some 3 70 sections and 12 schedules and contains 
Under s 13(2)(b) and (c) Fisheries Act. 
Above note 39, Burke 2-+. 
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significantly more detail appropriate to the New Zealand situation than would 
be feasible in an international convention. 
Even if the wording of the Fisheries Act is found not to adequately reflect the 
provisions of UNCLOS, the Act should be interpreted in the context of 
UNCLOS and coloured by that Convention. 118 
4 Foreign Licensed Access 
As noted in part I, New Zealand unilaterally declared a fishery zone of 9 miles 
(in addition to its 3 mile territorial sea) in 1965. lt was not the first State to 
claim a fishery zone, and it relied on the precedent set by the United Kingdom 
and Canada amongst others. At that time, foreign fishing in the waters around 
New Zealand had not long been established; the then Prime Minister, Keith 
Holyoake, stated - 119 
We in New Zealand are more fortunate than any other country that has recently 
proclaimed a 12-mile zone. because no other country has established traditional 
fishing rights off our shores .... The presence of foreign fishing Oeets off the coast 
of New Zealand is a relatively new thing for us. 
New Zealand made a reservation to the jurisdiction of the International Court of 
Justice (ICJ) as to the 9 mile fishery zone. Japan indicated an intention to seek a 
det.ermination from the ICJ, but New Zealand declined to submit a question for 
determination by the Court. Notwithstanding Japan's relatively brief history of 
fishing in New Zealand waters, New Zealand reached a compromise with Japan 
in 1967 by agreeing to phase out Japanese fishing . The substance of the 
agreement was that Japan would police its own vessels, and New Zealand 
would supply proof of infringement of the agreement. O'Connell cites the New 
Zealand legislation as -
critical in establishing international acquiescence in the concept of [9 mile fishery 
zones], linked with the notion of phasing out, which became a regular diplomatic 
Greenpeace New Zealand Inc v Afinister of Fisheries, above note 30. 17 . 
NZPD 1842-43, 11 August 1965. Mr Holyoake did not consider five years of foreign fishing 
in New Zealand waters as sufficient to establish traditional rights. 
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modality both to achieve a saving of face and to avoid a radical disruption of the 
fishery industry .120 
He sees phasing out as a diplomatic expedient to reduce the impact of extended 
jurisdiction on foreign fishing States, rather than as recognition of a legal 
obligation. 
By the. time New Zealand claimed jurisdiction to 200 miles in 1978, foreign 
fishing fleets within 200 miles of New Zealand's coast were better established. 
In 1976, according to Major, Japan caught 160,000 tons, the USSR caught 
100,000 tons, and Korea caught 60,000 tons of fish from the waters outside 
New Zealand's 12 mile limit . Following the enactment of the Territorial Sea 
and Exclusive Economic Zone Act 1977, New Zealand set the TAC for the 
participating foreign fleets at approximately one third of their catch prior to the 
declaration of the zone.
121 
Since the declaration of the 200 mile EEZ, New Zealand has conducted annual 
government to government negotiations with Japan, Korea and the USSR (now 
the Russian Federation). 
122 In keeping with its earlier practice of phasing out 
foreign fishing in its newly acquired waters, New Zealand ' s policy was to 
reduce foreign allocations by 10% in each fishing year from l 98 5 The amount 
by which the allocations were reduced was offered by tender to the New 
Zealand industry, with any amount not taken up being returned to the foreign 
States. 
The UNCLOS factors relevant to the giving of access to developing States are 
not so likely to be relevant in New Zealand decisions in considering the 
provision of access to foreign States, as the developing States in the South 
O'Connell , above note 45. 
Philip Major, "Fisheries Development in New Zealand since UNCLOS Ill A Case Stud~·· 
Proceedings, Law of the Sea 19th Annual Conference in ED Brown and RR Churchill (ed) 
The UN Convention of the lml' of the Sea: J111pact and !111ple111entation (Lm\' of the Sea 
Institute, University of Hawaii, Honolulu, 1987) 
Report of MAFFish, 1987. p 88. Extracts on file in the library of the Parliamentary 
Commissioner for the Environment. 
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Pacific region generally have substantial waters under their jurisdiction, and 
New Zealand is a considerable distance from them. 123 Of greater relevance to 
New Zealand is the need to minimise economic dislocation of the distant water 
fishing nations whose nationals have habitually fished in New Zealand's waters. 
As discussed, New Zealand has addressed this factor through its phasing out 
policy. 
(a) Identification of a swplus 
Part V of the Fisheries Act addresses foreign access to the fisheries of New 
Zealand's EEZ. Whereas the Fisheries Bill as introduced substantially 
reproduced the equivalent provisions of the Territorial Sea, Contiguous Zone 
and Exclusive Economic Zone Act 1977, the Fisheries Act contains a quite 
different formulation for determining whether there is any surplus . The earlier 
Act provided clearly for the Minister of Fisheries to determine the portion of the 
TAC that New Zealand fishing vessels had the capacity to harvest, and that any 
remaining portion of the TAC should constitute the allowable catch for foreign 
fishing vessels. 124 
Under the new regime, the calculation of any surplus stock available for foreign 
fishing fleets is made in either of two ways depending on whether or not the 
stock in question is subject to the QMS. Where a stock is subject to the QMS, 
the_ foreign allowable catch shall be the lesser of - 125 
• the portion of the TACC which may be taken in the EEZ determined for the 
stock by the Minister of Fisheries; or 
• the amount of ACE held by the Crown 111 respect of the stock at the 
beginning of the fishing year which remains unsold after being offered for 
sale to persons entitled to own quota (which generally does not include any 
overseas person) . 
However, in the past New Zealand has granted access to Fiji 's tuna vessels by an exchange 
of letters, which are no longer in force. 
Section 12 Territorial Sea, Contiguous Zone and b:clusive Economic Zone Ac1 1977 
Section 81(2) Fisheries Act. 
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As discussed earlier, the holding of ACE is a prerequisite to fishing and the 
entitlement to ACE depends on the holding of quota . There is no requirement 
that the owner of quota should fish its full entitlement and there may be reasons 
why it is prepared to hold quota which it does not fish (eg if it anticipates that 
its fishing effort will increase in the short term enabling it to use the quota at a 
later date or to make a profit in the market for quota). Alternatively, it may be 
prepared to hold quota in order to prevent some competitor obtaining it. 
There is no requirement under UNCLOS that a coastal State should allocate as 
surplus the amount of fish which could be taken by the domestic industry, but 
which is not taken. It is the capacity of the industry that the coastal State must 
determine and the excess of allowable catch over capacity that is available. This 
has not stopped some States from arguing for the re-allocation of uncaught 
quota. In 1987, the USSR pressed unsuccessfully for access to the more 
desirable northern waters of New Zealand's EEZ and was focusing on the 
"substantial uncaught allocation held by the Japanese". 
126 
Where the stock is not subject to the QMS, the foreign allowable catch is the 
lesser of -
127 
• the portion of the total catch limit (if any) for the stock determined by the 
Minister of Fisheries and which may be taken in the EEZ; and 
• a catch that is sustainable after taking into account the total catch limit (if 
any) for, and the domestic harvesting capacity of, the stock . 
The "domestic harvesting capacity" 
128 for stocks not covered by the QMS is 
defined as the total domestic commercial catch repo11ed for the previous fishing 
year by New Zealand fishing vessels within the New Zealand fisheries waters 
with an appropriate adjustment to allow for -
• any changes in the harvesting capacity of the domestic commercial fishing 
fleet due to 
MAFFish, above note 122, 90. 
Section 81(3) Fisheries Act. 
Section 81(5) Fisheries Act. 
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* recent investment in fishing vessels and fishing equipment; and 
* catch trends; and 
• non-commercial take and scientific take. 
It is reasonably safe to assume that stocks which are managed under the QMS 
are all stocks which are harvested by the domestic fishing industry. Not all 
stocks outside the QMS may be fished by the New Zealand industry, although 
they may be sought after and harvested by foreign vessels . It is unlikely that 
New Zealand would want to put effort into bringing stocks into the QMS unless 
the New Zealand industry was interested in them. For this reason, the Fisheries 
Act provides for the determination of a foreign allowable catch for such stocks 
which does not depend on the existence of catch limits for those stocks, but 
which must be sustainable. This is a pragmatic and reasonable response to the 
possible demands of foreign States to be allowed to take fish from such stocks 
and the impracticality of New Zealand fixing an allowable catch for every stock 
in its EEZ. 
(b) Allocation of any surplus 
Where it has been determined that there is a surplus, the Minister of Fisheries 
may apportion the foreign allowable catch among foreign States. 129 ln 
determining to whom and how to apportion the foreign allowable catch, the 
Minister is required to have regard to a number of matters set out in s 82(2), viz 
a) the degree to which fishing vessels of foreign countries have engaged m 
fishing in New Zealand's EEZ; 
b) the degree to which such countries have co-operated with 'ew Zealand in 
fisheries research and in the identification of stocks within the EEZ; 
c) the degree to which such countries have co-operated with New Zealand in 
the conservation and management of fisheries resources within the EEZ , 
and in the enforcement ofNew Zealand ' s laws relating to such resources; 
Section 82 Fisheries Act. 
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d) the degree to which such countries have complied with any relevant 
international obligations; and 
e) such other matters as the Minister, after consultation with the Minister of 
Foreign Affairs and Trade, considers to be relevant. 
The matters in paragraphs (a) to (c) clearly are similar to the factors which 
article 62 of UNCLOS deems relevant to the coastal State's decision on access . 
The matter in ( d) opens the door a little to non-fishing related factors as 
potentially New Zealand could withhold access from a State which did not 
comply with international obligations completely unrelated to fishing, although 
the international obligations under scrutiny must be " relevant" . Then the matter 
in ( e) throws the door wide open, although again matters considered under ( e) 
must be relevant, and the exercise of the Minister ' s discretion will be 
constrained by what is reasonable in the Wed11esb11ry sense. Although , the New 
Zealand legislation appears to have the potential to allow factors beyond those 
contemplated by UNCLOS to affect access decisions, this will be a matter of 
practice rather than of the law. 
Article 62(3) of UN CLOS authorises the coastal State to take into account "its 
other national interests". This provision could potentially be used to justify 
consideration of non-fishing-related matters . Juda supports thi s view; he sees 
the_ considerations which may be relevant to access under UNC LOS as 
"practically unlimited" and cites the action of the United States Government in 
denying access to the USSR and Poland for political reasons, namely the Soviet 
invasion of Afghanistan and the Polish crackdown on Solidarity respectively. 
130 
In the past, New Zealand has also let political considerations affect it s provision 
of access to a particular State - the USSR was restrict ed to fi shi ng within the 
Sub-Antarctic Zone following the Soviet invasion o f Afghani stan . 
1
:; 
1 
In negotiating agreements to allow foreign States access to the surplus, the 
coastal State may bargain to obtain some benefits from the foreign States in 
Juda, above note 4, 25 . 
MAFFish, above note 122, 88. 
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exchange for access. UNCLOS allows little scope for a coastal State to obtain 
benefits which need bear little or no relation to the benefits it is providing. 
However, Hey notes that the dispute settlement provisions of UNCLOS (article 
297(3)), which do not provide for binding decision-making by a third party and 
provide for conciliation only in limited circumstances, lend weight to her 
contention that the interests of the coastal State predominate in respect of the 
use of the living resources of its EEZ. 132 This may be so de facto, as the dispute 
resolution provisions at least reassure coastal States that fishing States will not 
be able to challenge their decisions. 
In 1978, under the Territorial Sea and Exclusive Economic Zone Act , New 
Zealand threatened to deny allocations of squid to Japan unless Japan agreed to 
increase the import quota for New Zealand butter. 133 ln the 1986/8 7 fishing 
year no across the board reduction in the foreign allocation was made under the 
phasing out policy pa11ly in recognition of the access which New Zealand-
caught squid had been granted to the Japanese market. 134 However, more 
recently New Zealand has attempted to treat the allocation of foreign allowable 
catch as an issue distinct from that of access to Japanese markets . This is 
appropriate as it seems doubtful that trade between States is relevant to 
decisions relating to access to fish New Zealand ' s waters . 
(c) . Licensing of foreign vessels 
The apportionment of foreign allowable catch is made among States, but , the 
actual foreign vessels which will take the States' allocations must obtain a 
licence to fish in the EEZ. Article 63(4)(a) specifically authorises coastal States 
to make laws providing for a licensing regime and requires foreign States to 
comply with such laws. 
Licences to take fish issued to the operators of foreign fishing vessels may be 
subject to all or any of a number of conditions listed in s 83(4) of the Fisheries 
Hey, above note 44, 48. 
O'Connell , above note 45, 566. 
MAFFish, above note 122, 90. 
135 
Act. These potential conditions range from restricting the areas of the EEZ in 
which the licensed operator may fish, to requiring the licensed vessels to enter 
New Zealand ports for inspection or other purposes, and to the installation on 
the vessel and the maintenance of any automatic location communication. The 
listed conditions all relate in some way to the activity of fishing or to the vessel, 
although they are not exhaustive. The Minister of Fisheries may impose 
conditions relating to "such other matters as [he or she] considers necessary or 
expedient" . 135 
Whereas in considering whether to give a particular State access to any surplus, 
New Zealand, as a coastal State, must take into account all relevant factors, 
including those listed in article 62(3) of UNCLOS, arguably the li censing regime 
for individual vessels is not subject to the same constraint, that is, unless the 
coastal State takes matters into account which are peculiar to the particular flag 
State rather than to the vessel. Under s 83(3) of the Fisheries Act , the Minister 
of Fisheries is required to have regard to the previous offending history (if any) 
of the vessel ' s operator, owner, master or crew in relation to fishing activities, 
whether in New Zealand, foreign or international waters . The Minister may also 
have regard to such other matters as he or she considers to be relevant . In 
making a decision not to licence a particular foreign vessel to take fish in the 
EEZ, New Zealand is no longer dealing directly with another State. The refusal 
of New Zealand to license a particular vessel will not necessarily affect the 
number of vessels of the flag State allowed to fish in the EEZ nor the amount of 
fish they are allowed to take. 
Whereas UNCLOS deals with relationships between States, the Act addresses 
the relationships between 1ew Zealand and members of the fishing industry, 
both domestic and foreign . The licensing regime established by Part V of the 
Act to enable access of foreign fishing interests to the fish of ew Zealand's 
EEZ addresses the issue at the level of the operator of a foreign fishing vessel. 
Section 83( 4 )(r) Fisheries Act. 
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New Zealand's refusal to license any particular foreign operator will not be 
open to challenge under UNCLOS. 
The Minister of Fisheries commented in relation to the Fisheries Bill, that 
"[ f]oreign licensed fishing has nearly been phased out in our waters, and [ the 
provisions of Part VJ will have minimal application". 136 However, this comment 
does not allow for the possibility of foreign States wanting to fish stocks which 
the New Zealand industry does not yet want, or have the capacity, to fish. 
5 Marine Mammals 
Article 65 of UNCLOS specifically addresses the management of manne 
mammals. Coastal States may prohibit, limit or regulate the exploitation of 
marine mammals more strictly than is otherwise provided for in Part V of the 
Convention. However, there is no obligation on coastal States to protect 
marine mammals absolutely. Article 61 ( 4) affords some protection to marine 
mammals by requiring the effects of fishing on associated and dependent species 
to be considered in the implementation of conservation and management 
measures. 
New Zealand's position on some marine mammals, as described by the Ministry 
of External Relations and Trade in 1991, is that "all cetaceans should be 
awarded maximum worldwide protection from exploitation". 137 
The intention of the Minister of Fisheries, expressed on the introduction of the 
Fisheries Bill, was that the Fisheries Act was to be a statute regulating use, and 
that the protection of marine species was addressed under conservation 
statutes. 138 To this end, the Fisheries Act 1996 provides for some amendments 
to the relevant conservation statutes, including the Marine Mammals Protection 
Act 1978 (MMPA) and the Wildlife Act 1953. The protection of some marine 
Minister of Fisheries, above note 89. 
New Zealand's National Report lo UNCED - Forging the Links. above note 79. 62 . 
Minister of Fisheries - refer text accompanying note 89 above. 
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species is also addressed through the provisions of the Driftnet Prohibition Act 
1991. However, the environmental principles enacted by the Fisheries Act are 
relevant to the conservation and management of marine mammals, especially 
principle (a) which states -
a) Associated or dependent species should be maintained abm·e a level that 
ensures their long-term viability. 
"Associated or dependent species" is defined in s 2 to mean -
any non-harvested species taken or otherwise affected by the taking of any 
harvested species. 
The definition of "harvested species" 139 is of no great assistance m trying to 
determine what species are "associated or dependent", although the implication 
is that there is no lawful authority for the taking of "associated or dependent 
species". This category of species would not include those for which lawful 
authority to take could be obtained. As noted above, 
140 the phrase "associated 
or dependent species" in principle (a) mirrors article 61 (3) of UN CLOS, but it is 
not clear whether it has the same meaning or whether such species are treated 
consistently by the Fisheries Act 1996. The term "species" is not defined in the 
Act, but, by implication from the definition of " stock", it includes fish , aquatic 
life (itself very broadly defined) and seaweed . 
One of the sustainability measures provided for in the Fisheries Act 1996 
effectively involves the setting of an allowable bycatch limit for marine 
mammals and other wildlife. Section 15(1) requires the Minister of Fisheries to 
take all reasonable steps to ensure that the "maximum allowable fishing-related 
mortality" level set by the relevant population management plans is not 
exceeded. The Minister may take such other measures as he or she considers 
necessary to further avoid, remedy, or mitigate any adverse effects of fishing on 
"Harvested species means "any fish , aquatic life, or seaweed that may for the time being be 
taken with lawful authority" . '· Aquatic life" covers all species of plant or ani rnal life that. at 
any stage of its life history, must inhabit water, and speci!ically includes seabirds. Refer to 
s 2 Fisheries Act 1996. 
Refer to text accompanying note 97 above. 
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relevant protected species. The population management plans are to be 
prepared under the Wildlife Act 1953 and the Marine Mammals Protection Act 
1978 (MMP A), as amended by the Fisheries Act 1996. 
The general rule established in the MMP A is that -
no person shall .. . take any marine mammal, whether alive or dead, in or from its 
natural habitat or in or from any other place without first obtaining a permit to do 
so from the Minister [ofConseivation). 141 
The MMP A makes a distinction between marine mammals which are threatened 
and those which are not, 142 although it does not elaborate on what it is to be 
threatened . A species may be declared to be threatened by the Minister of 
Conservation by notice in the Gazette .143 Before making such a declaration, the 
Minister is to have regard to any relevant international and New Zealand 
standards. Article 61 (3) of the Convention provides for "generally 
recommended international minimum standards" to be taken into account in the 
design of conservation and management measures . A declaration that certain 
species of marine mammals are threatened (and the consequences that flow from 
that declaration) could be considered to be conservation measures within the 
meaning of article 61 and therefore, any "generally recommended international 
minimum standards" should be taken into account in preparing such 
declarations . 
In respect of threatened species, the Minister of Conservation is required to 
determine a maximum bycatch level which should allow the species to achieve 
non-threatened status as soon as reasonably practicable within 20 years . For 
other species, the level is to be determined which should neither cause a net 
reduction in the size of the population nor seriously threaten the reproducti ve 
capacity of the species . 
Section 4 MMP A Permits may be obtained for research, or for display or zoological 
purposes. 
Section 2(3) Fisheries Act. 
A recent addition to the class of "threatened species" is the Hooker's sc,i lion: (1997) 
Brooker's Gazette 119. 
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Although couched in terms which suggest that marme mammals and other 
wildlife are to be protected by these measures, in fact, the population 
management plans are a mechanism for setting an allowable bycatch limit. This 
may be compared with the mechanism used by the IWC, which set a catch limit 
of zero in respect of cetaceans the subject of commercial whaling. In addition, 
the Minister of Conservation requires the approval of the Minister of Fisheries 
to these plans, which could be interpreted as implying that fisheries utilisation is 
to predominate over conservation objectives. 
144 This is the reverse of the 
situation under UNCLOS in which optimum utilisation is subordinated to the 
conservation and management measures. The Minister of Fisheries may concur 
with the draft plan after having regard to the impacts of implementing the 
maximum allowable fishing-related mortality level on commercial fishing and 
such other matters as the Minister considers relevant. 
145 Some environmental 
groups have interpreted this provision as setting "kill quotas for protected 
species". 146 However, in theory, the setting of such levels is intended to 
recognise the reality that some marine mammals and other protected species will 
inevitably be caught incidentally to the fishing activity. After all, s 15 must be 
read in the light of the environmental principles ins 9 of the Fisheries Act. 
Unfortunately, legitimising a certain level of bycatch sends the wrong signals to 
fishers and diminishes their incentive to operate in a way which minimises or 
avoids bycatch of marine mammals. An alternative way of addressing the issue 
of bycatch would be to provide for an offence of recklessly or negligently 
conducting fishing operations in a way which results in the bycatch of marine 
mammals. The provision for a maximum bycatch level provides scope for the 
fishing industry to lobby the Minister of Fisheries of the day, whereas there 
would be no such oppo11unity to influence the level the Minister if an offence 
was provided for. 
Section 3H(l)(m) MMPA. 
Section 3H(l)(n) MMPA. 
Conservation Nell's No 89, December 1994. 
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The formulation "maximum allowable fishing-related mortality" is used where 
the Act could simply have provided for a "maximum allowable bycatch". This 
suggests that the Government was endeavouring to avoid being seen to allow 
the taking of marine mammals, including whales (for which the IWC has 
established an allowable catch of zero) . 
The Department of Conservation administers manne mammals and manne 
mammal sanctuaries in accordance with statements of general policy approved 
by the Minister of Conservation and any conservation management strategy and 
any conservation management plan applicable to the area concerned . 
147 
Sanctuaries have been declared around the Auckland Islands and Banks 
Peninsula. 
The Driftnet Prohibition Act 1991 was enacted to implement the Driftnet 
Convention 1989. It prohibits all driftnet fishing in New Zealand fisheries 
waters, and driftnet fishing by New Zealand vessels or New Zealand citizens in 
the "Convention area" which covers areas of the South Pacific high seas and 
waters under the fisheries jurisdiction of any Party to the Convention . ln 
addition, the Act prohibits any vessel from having a driftnet on board while in 
New Zealand fisheries waters . 
New Zealand's approach to marine mammals is generally no less protective of 
them than UNCLOS requires . However, it is arguable that New Zealand falls 
short of UN CLOS in enabling the setting of maximum bycatch levels . 
Section 3 A MMP A. 
Ill CONCLUSION 
The philosophical prov1s1ons of the Fisheries Act, including the nature of 
sustainability measures, is in sympathy with the flavour of articles 61 and 62 of 
UNCLOS . The environmental principles in the Act reflect obligations under 
both UNCLOS and the Biodiversity Convention; and the information principles 
require a precautionary approach to be taken to fisheries management. A 
number of terms are imported from UNCLOS into the Act and defined there, 
however, the Act is expressly to be interpreted in a manner consistent with 
UNCLOS . 
New Zealand's formulation of the obligation under UNCLOS to take 
conservation and management measures aimed at maintaining or restoring 
stocks at, or to, levels at which they are able to produce qualified MSY, 
contains all the essential elements of article 61 (3 ). The Fisheries Act is more 
specific than the Convention. This is consistent with the nature of UN CLOS as 
an umbrella convention which leaves much of the detail to the domestic laws of 
States. New Zealand has decided what types of environmental factors are likely 
to be relevant to particular sorts of decisions, leaving still more detailed 
decisions to the discretion of the Minister of Fisheries in pa11icular cases . 
Criticism of the formulation of MSY in the Fisheries Bill appears to be 
unfounded. 
The obligation of a coastal State to grant access to its surplus relates to the fish 
that the domestic industry does not have the capacity to take, rather than to fish 
it does not take for other reasons . 
New Zealand 's pragmatic solution to the potential problem posed by the broad 
obligation in UN CLOS to "determine the allowable catch of the living resources 
of the EEZ" is to provide that where there is no catch limit for a stock, the 
catch taken must be sustainable. 
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New Zealand's phase out policy in respect of foreign fishing fleets is a 
reasonable way of ensuring that the domestic industry has the opportunity to 
fish to the limits of its capacity, while ensuring that any surplus is made available 
to foreign fleets. 
In its provisions on the allocation of surplus, the Act requires that the Minister 
of Fisheries have regard to some matters which are expressed sufficiently 
broadly to encompass non-fishing related matters. Arguably, UNCLOS allows 
such matters to be considered, although the matters considered by the Minister 
under the Fisheries Act are required to meet a test of relevance which would 
restrict the matters considered to fishing-related matters . 
In the past, New Zealand's negotiations with foreign States have involved 
factors unrelated to fishing activities, such as trade and political considerations. 
Such considerations are probably not relevant to access decisions, and it is 
appropriate that New Zealand has decided to separate such considerations from 
the fishing negotiations 
The licensing regime for foreign vessels to operate in the EEZ is a matter of 
detail which UN CLOS leaves to the discretion of the coastal State. 
UNCLOS does not provide for the absolute protection of marine mammals, 
although States may choose to provide greater protection for marine mammals 
than required by UNCLOS. New Zealand has had legislation protecting marine 
mammals since 1978, and made additional provision in 1996. The 
authorisation of a "maximum allowable fishing-related mortality" level for 
marine mammals sends the wrong signals to fishers and is arguabl y in breach of 
New Zealand ' s obligations under UNCLOS . New Zealand ' s other efforts to 
protect marine mammals suggest a genuine intention to afford protection . 
Where there is doubt as to the meamng of a New Zealand statute which 
purports to give effect to an international convention, the New Zealand Cou11s 
148 
149 
may consider that international convention in interpreting the statute. 
148 As the 
Fisheries Act 1996 does not repeat the exact language of UN CLOS, although it 
purports to implement New Zealand's obligations under it and other 
conventions, the Courts may refer to UNCLOS to resolve any difficulties in 
interpreting the Fisheries Act 1996. 
149 The ability of the Courts to consider the 
meaning of the Fisheries Act in the light of UN CLOS is reinforced by s 5 of the 
Act. 
On paper, New Zealand's system of fisheries management appears to be 
consistent with the spirit and intention of UNCLOS However, whether New 
Zealand has devised a system which will avoid the tragedy of the commons and 
justify extended coastal State jurisdiction will depend on the practical 
application of New Zealand's fisheries legislation. 
There are a number of issues concerning the implementation of the Fisheries Act 
1996, the resolution of which will have significant implications for the 
sustainability of New Zealand's fisheries resources . These include the 
implications of the Ministry of Fisheries' cost recovery regime on the basis of 
"he who pays the piper calls the tune", and the rigor, subject matter and 
independence of research undertaken in New Zealand 's market-focused 
environment, which threatens the independence of scientists . I have become 
aware of these issues in the course of my research, and although they are not 
matters which I have been able to address in this paper, they are matters worthy 
of serious attention. 
Law Commission, A Nell' Zealand Guide to /n1ernatio11al Lall' and its Sources: Report 3.J 
(Wellington, 1996) paras 71 -72. 
Greenpeace Nell' Zealand Inc v 1\1inister of Fisheries above note 30. 
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